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CVSS 9.3 · CRITICAL

CVE-2026-63939

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer. The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert). Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role.

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Análisis

A critical buffer overflow has been discovered in the Linux kernel KVM hypervisor affecting AMD SEV environments. The vulnerability allows a guest VM to trigger memory corruption in the host kernel during certain requests, which could lead to a VM escape. System administrators and cloud operators using AMD-based virtualization should prioritize kernel updates.

Roles relevantes

LinuxCloudCyberSecurityBackendHardware

Severidad

Puntaje: 9.3(CRITICAL)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
AV: LOCAL
AC: LOW
PR: NONE
UI: NONE
S: CHANGED
C: HIGH
I: HIGH
A: HIGH

EPSS

Probabilidad de explotación (próx. 30 días): 0.0022 (0.2%)
Percentil: 12.1%
EPSS: 2026-07-20

Descripción técnica

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer. The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert). Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role.

Publicada: 19/7/2026, 16:17:12
Última modificación: 20/7/2026, 15:16:57

Referencias

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