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CVSS 9.1 · CRITICAL

CVE-2026-46043

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.

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Analysis

A critical vulnerability in the Linux kernel RDMA (Soft-RoCE) driver allows a remote attacker to trigger kernel-level memory corruption using crafted network packets. If your infrastructure utilizes RDMA or Soft-RoCE, this flaw could potentially lead to a system compromise or kernel panic.

Relevant roles

LinuxBackendCyberSecurityCCloudDocker

Severity

Score: 9.1(CRITICAL)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
AV: NETWORK
AC: LOW
PR: NONE
UI: NONE
S: UNCHANGED
C: HIGH
I: NONE
A: HIGH

EPSS

Probability of exploitation (next 30 days): 0.0005 (0.0%)
Percentile: 14.6%
EPSS: 2026-06-01

Technical description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.

Published: 5/27/2026, 2:17:23 PM
Last modified: 6/1/2026, 5:17:20 PM

References

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